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The Impact of Water Price Uncertainty on the Adoption
of Precision Irrigation Systems
Abstract
The paper examines whether a rm is more or less likely to adopt conservation
technology when input prices are stochastic. The results are critical to determining
whether programs and contracts that reduce input price uncertainty may deter the
adoption of conservation practices. An economic model of the technology adoption
decision shows that the net eect of input price risk is ambiguous and depends on
several factors: the mean price eect, the shutdown eect, and the risk aversion eect.
Results are estimated using water price and irrigation technology adoption data. The
results show that a stable input price increases the adoption of conservation technology,
but the impact depends on crop choice and land quality characteristics.
1 Introduction
In many regions there is growing pressure for a limited water supply to provide benets
to a variety of users, including irrigators, residential customers, and industrial producers.
Precision irrigation technologies such as drip and microsprinkler systems can help in meeting
this multiplicity of needs. Improved technology increases the productivity of a nite natural
resource. However, such technologies also have high investment costs and understanding the
factors that determine adoption behavior has been the focus of a sizeable literature. The
positive impact of higher water prices on the adoption of conservation irrigation technology
is well established in the literature (Caswell and Zilberman, 1985; Negri and Brooks, 1990;
Green et al., 1996; Moreno and Sunding, 2005; Baerenklau and Knapp, 2007). The cost of
providing water to irrigators is driven by energy costs, either through the cost of pumping
groundwater or of moving surface water through canals. Thus, uncertainty about energy
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prices fundamentally changes the expected cost of irrigation water. This uncertainty has
been exacerbated in recent years by energy price trends that have shown increases in both
the mean and variance in recent years.1 Due to these trends concerns about price risk may
be more relevant in the decision to adopt precision technologies than changes in average
prices. While the impact of an increase in the mean price on technology choice is clear, an
increase in price risk is less obvious.
This paper answers the question of whether input price risk increases or decreases adop-
tion rates in the context of precision irrigation. The paper contributes to the literature on
technology adoption under risk in several ways: it claries the ambiguous eect of price
risk in the technology adoption decision; it uses eld level data on actual production and
technology decisions to measure the impact of price risk; and it improves on much of the
previous empirical estimation by accounting for the correlation between technology and out-
put choices and for systematic dierences in the assignment of price structure to producers.
We take advantage of a unique set of data that includes two exogenously determined groups
where one group pays a xed input price and the other pays a stochastic price. By design
the mean price paid by the two groups is the same. This allows us to empirically measure
the net eect of price risk on irrigation technology choice and discuss the implications for
input use and policy design.
Other work has examined the substitution between damaging and non-damaging inputs
under input price risk in the context of insurance. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) nd
evidence that producers enrolled in crop insurance use higher levels of chemicals and inter-
pret this to mean that chemicals are risk-increasing inputs. However, follow-up studies by
Babcock and Hennessy (1996) and Smith and Goodwin (1996) nd that insured producers
use fewer chemical inputs. More recent work shows that the debate is still not fully resolved.
1For example, the mean price per barrel of oil was 25% higher in the 2005-2009 period than in the 1975-
1979 period. However, the standard deviation of the price was over 300% higher. Source: U.S. Energy
Information Administration
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Sheri (2005) shows that the result depends on whether polluting inputs are risk-reducing
or risk-increasing and Mishra, Nimon, and S. El-Osta (2005) nd dierent results depending
on the type of polluting input.
A contribution of the current research is that most existing work only considers the
eect of input risk at the intensive margin (shifts in input and output quantities) but not
at the extensive margin, which allows rms to shut down or expand as a response to risk.
One exception is Wu (1999), who showed that insurance may decrease the use of polluting
inputs at the intensive margin but still increase overall use due to extensive margin eects.
Our model allows for extensive margin changes via the decision to temporarily suspend
operations.
In this paper, we consider the impact of input price uncertainty on conservation tech-
nology adoption. One factor that aects adoption is the expected input price, or mean
price. A higher expected price for an input encourages investment in technology that uses
the input more eciently. Risk aversion will also aect levels of adoption. Previous results
have shown that risk aversion will increase the adoption of a technology if it is risk reducing
(Sandmo, 1971; Feder, 1980; Isik and Khanna, 2003; Koundouri, Nauges, and Tzouvelekas,
2006). Other than a few exceptions (Carey and Zilberman, 2002; Isik and Khanna, 2003;
Koundouri, Nauges, and Tzouvelekas, 2006) much of this work measures the impact of un-
certainty on the choice of capacity or capital (a continuous variable) and not on the choice
between a small number of discrete technologies. In contrast to other articles our paper
explicitly considers an individual's ability to temporarily suspend operations (we refer to
this as the shutdown eect).2 Specically, we incorporate these three eects (mean price,
risk aversion, and shutdown) and distinguish the role of each into an analysis of conservation
2A couple of papers on electricity generation have discussed the importance of considering shutdown
eects but have not included them in the economic model (Reedman, Graham, and Coombes, 2006; Wickart
and Madlener, 2007). One paper that included the possibility of shutting down did so using numerical sim-
ulation (Nasakkala and Fleten, 2005). To our knowledge, none has included an economic model adequately
accounting for the possibility of shutdown with an empirical estimation using actual adoption decisions.
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technology adoption under input price risk.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the economic model of technology
adoption. Two models are compared, where input prices in the second are a mean-preserving
spread of input prices in the rst. We nd that the impact of xed input prices on technology
adoption depends on several factors: the probability that the rm chooses to operate under
high input prices, the cost savings achieved from the conservation technology, and the level
of risk aversion. We are able to determine some denitive results about operating decisions.
We nd that shutdown rates are greater with stochastic input prices, and we also nd that
shutdown rates are higher under conventional technology than under conservation technology.
Section 3 provides a description of the data that we use to test the model and the econometric
methods. The data comes from two groups of irrigators where one group pays a xed price
per unit for inputs while the other is subject to uctuations based on energy markets. Due to
dierences in the characteristics of each group we need to correct for dierences in the sample.
We use a pre-processing technique that allows us to use standard parametric estimation while
still correcting for sample dierences (Ho et al., 2007a). Section 4 concludes the paper with
a discussion of the implications of the results.
2 Economic Model
The general framework is based on a timeline where a rm must rst make a decision about
investing in a new conservation technology. When this decision is made the rm knows the
distribution of future input prices but not the realization of those prices. After the decision
is made about whether to adopt the technology the price uncertainty is resolved and the rm
decides whether or not to operate and the level of inputs to use in production. There are
many papers that examine investment under uncertainty using a dynamic framework such
as the models developed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Our model is a simplied version of
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a dynamic decision making process which is presented in a static framework. We are able
to make this simplication without losing any useful insight because we assume that while
future prots are uncertain, there is no new information that will be learned in future periods
and that the realized prices in each future period are independent.
Let y = h(e) be the production function, where we make the standard assumptions that
h0(e) > 0 and h00(e) < 0. Let e = x denote the eective input, where  indicates the input
use eciency (dened between 0 and 1) and x indicates applied inputs. With our empirical
example of irrigated agricultural production, x is the level of applied water in agricultural
production, e is the amount of water actually used by the crop, and y is the yield. We
consider two technologies: conservation (i = 1) and conventional (i = 0), with 1 > 0.
The annualized cost of technology i is i, with 1 > 0 and this cost must be paid each
year regardless of production activities. Therefore, while the sunk cost of investment does
not aect the marginal conditions for input use, it does aect the initial decision to adopt a
conservation technology. The price of input x is denoted by w. In the analysis, we compare
the incentives to adopt a conservation technology when w is known with certainty and when
w is stochastic. We recognize that there are many other sources of uncertainty to a producer
such as output price uncertainty or production uncertainty. However, those factors will aect
both groups and can be ignored for the current analysis. The model we develop assumes that
long run decisions are made based on a comparison of the optimal short run decisions for
each technology. This model of irrigation technology choice is based on the work of Caswell
and Zilberman (1986) and has continued to be used in the literature (Green et al., 1996; Isik
and Khanna, 2003; Moreno and Sunding, 2005).
2.1 Input Price Certainty
We rst consider the decision to adopt conservation technology when input prices are known
with certainty. We compare the annual prots under each technology to determine if a
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producer will adopt the conservation technology. While the decision to invest in conservation
technology is a long run decision and based on a dynamic model when there is no uncertainty
a static model will provide the same results with less complexity. Under each technology,
the producer chooses the level of inputs based on the following:
max
xi
i = h(ixi)  wxi   i
When there is no uncertainty the producer chooses xi (w) according to the following:
h0(ixi (w)) =
w
i
= pi (1)
The left side of equation 1 is the marginal productivity of the input, while the right side
is the price per unit of eective input. The conservation technology has a higher level of
input-use eciency (1 > 0), and therefore the eective price of the input is lower, as fewer
inputs are required to achieve the same output level. Figure 1 shows one example of the total
and marginal production values as a function of applied water. In Figure 1 the positively
sloped curves denote the total production value (h(x)) under the old and new technology
(0 and 1 respectively) and the negatively sloped lines denote the marginal value (h0(x)).
Figure 1 shows a case where the old technology uses a higher level of inputs for the same
total production value. However, the relative level of input use and total production value
will vary depending on the technology and the input price.
<< Insert Figure 1 >>
When input prices are certain we denote the input price as wc and the change in annual
prots from the adoption of conservation technology is the following:
 = f[h(1x1(wc))  wcx1(wc)]  [h(0x0(wc))  wcx0(wc)]g   f1   0g (2)
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Equation 2 compares the net benet of reducing input use, where the net benet is
measured as the change in net revenue, with the annualized capital costs of the conservation
technology. In cases where the output and input-saving eects are greater than the increased
capital costs, the conservation technology is adopted. When conservation simply increases
input use eciency, Equation 2 is reduced to comparing the input cost savings with increased
capital costs.
2.2 Input Price Uncertainty
In this section we consider the decision to adopt conservation technology when future input
prices are uncertain. For the analysis to hold, at least some portion of the capital cost of
adopting conservation technology must be irreversible. We assume that the input price has
cumulative distribution F (w) and probability distribution f(w) which is distributed between
wL and wH with mean wc and standard deviation w. This assumption ensures that the price
distribution is a mean-preserving spread of the xed price in Section 2.1.
2.2.1 Short-run decisions
We consider the choice of technology as a long run decision. Therefore, in the short run
a producer has two decisions: whether to temporarily suspend operations and the level
of variable inputs to use. The decisions are made by rst solving for the optimal input
level given the realized input price, and then determining if it is protable to operate.
For technology i, we dene xi (w) according to the condition in Equation 1, which sets the
marginal productivity of the input equal to its eective price. After observing the realization
of stochastic input prices, producers may choose to suspend operations. We denote the
shutdown input price for each technology as ~wi(h(:); i). This price is dened by the zero
prot condition:
h(ix

i ( ~wi))  ~wixi ( ~wi) = 0 (3)
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The condition in Equation 3 ensures that all operating producers are able to cover the variable
costs of production. If ~wi > wH a producer will not shut down. While this is outcome is
possible it is not interesting for the economic model so we consider the case where ~wi < wH .
Totally dierentiating Equation 3 with respect to i and ~wi shows that producers operate
over a greater range of input prices with higher input use eciency and that the shutdown
price is higher under conservation technology.
2.2.2 Technology Adoption under Uncertain Input Prices
In the long run, producers must decide whether to use the conventional technology or to
invest in conservation technology. We assume that a risk averse rm maximizes the expected
utility of future prot. We denote the mean and standard deviation of prot as  and 
respectively. We assume that utility is a function of the rst two moments of the prot
function and denote it as U(; ) with U > 0 and U < 0. This framework was developed
by Meyer (1987) and has been used by many authors (Isik and Khanna, 2003; Munshi, 2004;
Gaynor and Gertler, 1995).
Operating decisions are made after the input price is realized so we denote the realized
prot for value of w as (w). For each technology the realized prot is (w) = h(ixi (w)) 
wxi (w)  i if w  ~wi and (w) =  i if w > ~wi.
The per-period expected prot under each type of technology is the following:
0 =
Z ~w0
wL
(h(0x

0(w))  wx0(w))df(w)  0 (4)
1 =
Z ~w1
wL
(h(1x

1(w))  wx1(w))df(w)  1 (5)
To determine conservation technology adoption, we compare Equations 4 and 5.
Risk aversion did not enter the model in the previous sections since all of the decisions are
made under certainty. However, technology adoption decisions are made under uncertainty
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about future prices and prots. It is assumed that the conservation technology (i = 1) has
a higher level of input-use eciency, denoted by 1 > 0. Therefore, the variance of the
price of eective water (i.e., the water that is actually used by the rm) is lower with the
conservation technology. When w is distributed with variance 2 the variance of the eective
price is V ar(pi) = (
1
i
)22 and V ar(p1) < V ar(p0). A producer will adopt the conservation
technology when the expected utility is higher than with the conventional technology. Taking
a rst order approximation of the dierence in utility from the two technologies shows the
following:
U(1; 1)  U(0; 0)  1   0 + U
U
(1   0) (6)
=
Z ~w0
wL
((h(1x

1(w))  wx1(w))  (h(0x0(w))  wx0(w)))df(w)
+
Z ~w1
~w0
(h(1x

1(w))  wx1(w))df(w)  (1   0) +
U
U
(1   0)
To determine how a shift to xed input prices changes the incentive for technology adop-
tion we compare Equation 2 and 6 and examine the expression for  (U(1; 1) U(0; 0).
If this expression is positive, the incentive to adopt is higher with xed input prices. Substi-
tuting ~(wc) for  + (1   0) and b(w) for (h(1x1(w))  wx1(w))  (h(0x0(w)) 
wx0(w)) we have the following:
   (U(1; 1)  U(0; 0)) = (1  F ( ~w0))~(wc)| {z }
A
(7)
+ (F ( ~w0)~(wc) 
Z ~w0
wL
b(w)dfw)  (Z ~w1
~w0
(h(1x

1(w))  wx1(w))df(w))| {z }
B
  U
U
(1   0)| {z }
C
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Part A of Equation 7 is the shutdown eect. This is the range of input prices where a
producer needs to shut down with stochastic prices. This is unambiguously positive. The
impact of the shutdown eect is to increase adoption rates under xed input prices. Part
B of Equation 7 is the mean price eect and measures the net benet for producers of
being able to take advantage of low input prices with a stochastic input price. The sign of
this is ambiguous: the combined eect of the rst two terms is positive since the expected
value of w over the range (wL; ~w0) is less than wc, and the third term is negative since the
conservation technology increases the range of protability under stochastic input prices.
Part C of Equation 7 is the risk aversion eect. This measures the additional incentive
that producers have to adopt a risk-reducing conservation technology under stochastic input
prices. The risk aversion eect is unambiguously negative for risk-averse producers. The rst
component of part C is the ratio of the marginal disutility of prot risk to the marginal utility
of wealth. This is a standard risk preference measure, is negative for a risk-averse producer,
and the absolute value increases with the level of risk aversion. Since V ar(p1) < V ar(p0) we
know that the second part of C is also negative. Under risk neutrality part C is zero and
the dierence in adoption rate is due to the shutdown and mean price eects..
The results of the analytical model show that shutdown rates are greater with stochastic
input prices and higher with conventional technology than with conservation technology.
However, the net eect of stochastic input prices is ambiguous in determining conservation
technology adoption behavior.
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section we apply the results of the analytical model to a unique data source that
includes information on technology choice, input price uncertainty, and shutdown rates.
This allows us to empirically test the economic model and to determine which factors are
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dominant in predicting actual adoption and shutdown behavior.
3.1 Data
To answer this question, we combine data from several sources. The data on land use comes
from Arvin Edison Water and Storage District (AEWSD), a utility serving approximately
275 farming operations that are located 90 miles north of Los Angeles, California. AEWSD
collects technology and output choice data at the eld level.
The data has eld level information for 4,764 elds on crop choice (an average of 1,191 per
year), irrigation technology, and water service area. The data covers the 1999-2002 period.
Information on the price of groundwater was estimated in 1993 by AEWSD based on the
depth to groundwater (Green et al., 1996) or based on the marginal price for surface water.
We adjust the estimated prices for groundwater users to the study years using the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) and update the marginal price for surface water based on AEWSD water
rates. For groundwater users, this price captures dierences in the depth to groundwater
across the district. The price will also vary based on energy prices and we use annual xed
eects to capture dierences in the price of energy over time. Finally, we use landowner
information from the Kern County Tax Assessor oce. We are able to match the landowner
with the eld level information using the Assessor Parcel Number, or APN. While we can
match the landowner with the eld information we are unable to track a single eld over
time due to the structure of the data.3 The eld level data includes one observation for each
unique crop-technology pair, implying that a single APN appears in the data multiple times
in a single year.
3Since we cannot track a single eld over time we are not able to use standard panel data methods for
the analysis. However, we do several checks to ensure that this issue does not change our results. First, we
include year indicator variables for all of our analysis. We also run the full analysis for a single year of data
and nd that the results are not signicantly dierent than when we include the pooled data.
11
3.1.1 Environmental variables
Previous research has shown that eld level variation on environmental quality characteris-
tics such as slope, soil quality, and average climate are important explanatory variables in
determining production choices on crop and irrigation technology (Caswell and Zilberman,
1985; Lichtenberg, 1989; Ogg and Gollehon, 1989; Green et al., 1996; Moreno and Sunding,
2005). For example, previous papers have found that owners of low quality land are more
likely to adopt conservation irrigation technology, as the relative gains from adoption are
greater than with high quality land. The environmental variables used are chosen to re-
ect soil and topography characteristics relevant to farming and irrigation. These variables
(slope, elevation, soil permeability, number of frost-free days per year, average precipitation
and average temperature) are long run averages and do not change over time, but do vary
between sections. These variables were collected by the Kern County Natural Resource Con-
servation Service, and are described in more detail in Green et al. 1996. These data address
the cross-sectional variation among microclimates within AEWSD.
3.1.2 Production variables
The data set contains an observation on crop and irrigation technology for each eld under
production and is recorded for the spring and fall planting seasons. The region has a mix of
crops including perennial crops such as grapes and oranges, annual crops such as carrots and
onions, and eld crops such as hay and alfalfa. There is also a lot of variation in the type of
irrigation system used with drip, sprinkler, gravity, and microsprinkler all used extensively.
Table 1 shows the distribution by crop and technology type. Both crop and irrigation
technology types are well represented, with annual crops and conservation irrigation on 38.7
and 79.0 percent of the elds, respectively.
<< Insert Table 1 >>
<< Insert Table 2 >>
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Table 2 shows that both groundwater and surface water areas are well represented in
the data, with 55.6 and 44.4 percent of the elds, respectively. We dene conservation
technology as drip or sprinkler irrigation. We include both perennial and annual crops
in the empirical analysis although we expect that the impact of input price risk will dier
between the two categories. Thus, we will need to incorporate this dierence in our empirical
methodology. In particular, the shutdown eect that we discussed earlier is not a viable
option with perennial crops.4 These crops represent long term investments in a similar
manner as conservation irrigation. With annual crops, planting decisions get made on a
yearly basis, allowing a producer to respond quickly to changing conditions and prices.
Shutting down is a valid option with annual crops through fallowing land, which we use
as our indicator of the shutdown decision discussed in the analytical model. In addition,
evidence from previous research shows that the decisions to adopt conservation irrigation
and permanent crops are highly correlated and we need to correct for this potential bias
(Lichtenberg, 1989; Moreno and Sunding, 2005; Schoengold, Sunding, and Moreno, 2006).
3.1.3 Land Ownership Information
We use information on land ownership to provide a measure of risk attitude. There are
a variety of methods used in the literature to estimate risk preferences. Recent work by
Pope, LaFrance, and Just (2011) suggests using techniques based on portfolio theory to
measure risk attitudes by using investment decisions. That method requires information on
wealth, which we do not have available for the AEWSD region. Other methods have been
developed by Antle (1987) to use input and output data to measure risk attitudes, and these
methods have been applied to decisions made about water availability uncertainty (Groom
et al., 2008). These methods are useful for disentangling risk attitudes based on production
data but require complete input and output data for at least one production activity. In
4While fallowing perennial crops is not an option producers do have some exibility in the amount of
water applied, and applying less water for reduced yields is an option when the eective water price is high.
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the current paper we have land use data (crop and irrigation technology) but we lack any
data on yields or other production inputs. However, previous literature has found that farm
size is a signicant predictor of risk attitudes, with farm size negatively correlated with risk
aversion (Saha, Love, and Schwart, 1994; Koundouri et al., 2009). When separating relative
and absolute risk aversion, Saha, Shumway, and Talpaz (1994) found that small farms have
higher absolute risk aversion and lower relative risk aversion than large farms.
Using tax information from the Kern County Tax Assessor we are able to create a
landowner ID for each eld in our sample and a measure of total land holdings for each
landowner. Since we are interested in how a landowner chooses to manage his or her agri-
cultural land we use the total area in agricultural land (Farmsize), which is measured in
thousands of acres. This measure will include land that is left fallow. The average landowner
in AEWSD has 309.4 acres although this is highly skewed. A few landowners have more
than 2000 acres in agricultural land while the majority have less than 200 acres. We use this
measure as a proxy for risk attitude.
3.2 Water Service Area as an Indicator of Price Risk
Unlike many irrigation districts, users in AEWSD are divided into surface and groundwater
users, with each being a distinct group (denoted by WSA). Surface water users (WSA = 1)
are not allowed to dig wells or pump groundwater, so we know that surface water is their
marginal source for irrigation, while groundwater is the only source of irrigation for the
second group. This distinction is exogenous to an individual land owner and is xed over
time for a particular eld. The pricing structure that AEWSD has developed is designed to
keep the mean water price the same for both groundwater and surface water users (Green
et al., 1996). However, surface water users pay a fee and have water delivered directly to their
elds, while groundwater users pay a reduced fee, but have to pay the full costs of pumping.
In both cases the xed component of the total charge is low relative to the variable cost.
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For surface water users, the xed fee is $94 per acre. While this is higher than the
variable fee of $65 or $51 per acre-foot, the district assumes an average application rate of
2.75 acre-feet per acre. Therefore, on average a producer using surface water pays $140 to
$179 per acre for the variable fee and the xed fee is 34 to 40 percent of total water costs.
Groundwater users pay a smaller xed fee of $23 per acre. The largest variable cost to
groundwater users is diesel fuel, which has a price that varies based on market conditions.
Based on the range of depth to groundwater in the area and average water application rates,
the xed fee is between 8.5 and 17 percent of total water cost for groundwater users.
To incorporate dierences in the average water price across the district we include a price
for water. The price for water was estimated in 1993 by AEWSD based on the depth to
groundwater (for groundwater users) and the marginal price of water delivery (for surface
water users). The Water price variable captures dierences in the average price between
groundwater users and allows us to identify the mean price eect from Equation 7. The
price that groundwater users actually pay will vary around this average based on energy
prices while the price for surface water users is xed. Since we cannot track a single eld
over time we cannot empirically measure the shutdown eect from Equation 7. However we
have evidence that groundwater users shut down operations more frequently than surface
water users. For elds that grow annual crops leaving the eld fallow in the fall (the second
growing season) is an option. Overall approximately 66 percent of the elds with annual
crops in the spring season are left fallow in the fall season while the other 34 percent of the
elds are replanted. Based on the economic model, we expect that fallowing will occur more
frequently with stochastic input prices. In the groundwater (surface water) area, 71 (63)
percent of the elds in annual crops are left fallow in the fall season.5
The underlying question that we want to answer is if producers facing a stochastic input
price are more likely to adopt conservation technology than those facing a xed input price.
5Using a means test we nd this dierence is statistically signicant at the 99% level.
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In the data, the variable that represents the input price structure is the water service area
(WSA). The price of pumping groundwater is based on the depth to groundwater and
the cost of fuel. The depth to groundwater in AEWSD ranges between 200 and 500 feet,
although the depth is fairly constant for a single eld (GWB, 2006). The cost of diesel fuel
during the sample period ranges between $1.10 and $1.70 per gallon, with the price during
most of the period under $1.50.6 Using assumptions about technology for a standard well,
Figure 2 shows how the marginal cost of pumping groundwater varies during the sample
period by depth to groundwater.
<< Insert Figure 2 >>
Figure 2 also shows the variable fee that surface water irrigators pay per acre-foot of
water. In contrast to the variability in groundwater prices, rates for surface water are stable
during the study period. The variable fee was reduced in 1998 from about $65 to about
$51. The reason for the price change is that AEWSD found that they were over-collecting
revenue, and water districts in California operate on a revenue-neutral basis. A comparison
of the prices paid by the two groups of irrigators shows that the range of variable prices for
irrigation water has a large area of overlap between the two users.
3.3 Econometric Model
The primary question that we want to answer is if stochastic input prices increase or decrease
conservation technology adoption. The diculty in measuring this is that we only observe
adoption choices for a particular eld under a single rate structure. To estimate the impact
of the Water Service Area (WSA) on conservation technology adoption there are several
possible estimation strategies.
One method to do this is with a probit analysis of the irrigation technology. There are
two issues that are of concern, both of which might result in biased parameter estimates if
6Historical diesel prices were obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
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we use a single probit estimation. First, we are concerned about the dierences between
the two samples. For this method to be consistent, it requires that the two water service
areas are suciently similar in the explanatory variables. If there are systematic dierences
in the explanatory variables between the two WSAs, a single estimation which uses the
entire sample may be biased. This is potentially a problem because the two service areas are
not distributed evenly. Due to infrastructure development, elds that use surface water are
likely to be adjacent to other elds that also use surface water. The non-random geographic
distribution of the treatment means that land quality characteristics such as slope and soil
permeability are not distributed evenly between the two service areas. Second, previous
literature has shown a signicant correlation between crop choice and irrigation technology
(Lichtenberg, 1989; Moreno and Sunding, 2005). Not accounting for this correlation may
lead to biased estimates of the eect of the water service area.
Some of the land quality characteristics vary across the irrigation district, and therefore
could be correlated with the water service area as well as the technology choice. Table 3
shows the dierences in the means of the explanatory variables for the full sample. The
test of mean dierences shows the t-statistic for continuous variables and the z-statistic for
discrete variables, which measures the statistical signicance of the dierences between the
two samples. A comparison of the two samples shows that this concern is valid. Almost
all of the township variables are signicantly dierent, which conrms that surface and
groundwater users are not randomly distributed over the district. There are also large
dierences in many of the land quality variables. Fields in the groundwater service area
have, on average, lower slope (Slope), higher soil permeability (Permeability), and are
located at a lower elevation than elds in the surface water area. The township variables,
which are geographical locations, show that the proportion of land in each township is
statistically dierent between the two water service areas. While the dierence between the
variables is consistently statistically signicant, the magnitude of the dierences does vary.
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For example, the mean number of frost-free days (Frost-free days) and average temperature
(Temperature) diers by less than one percent while the average values for soil permeability
and slope dier by more than 30 percent.
<< Insert Table 3 >>
An estimation strategy that can reduce the bias associated with dierences in the two
groups is to use propensity score matching, where each observation from the control group
is matched with an observation from the treatment group. The propensity score is the
estimated probability of being treated (in this case treatment refers to being part of the
surface water area) conditional on observable variables.
While using the propensity score is better than neglecting the dierences in the two
samples, it does require matching based on observable characteristics and limits the range
of econometric estimation techniques that we can use. An alternative estimation strategy
that has been proposed by Ho et al. (2007a) is to preprocess the data before estimating
treatment eects. By preprocessing the data, we look for the common support of the two
samples over the observable characteristics and drop those observations that fall outside of
the common support. While this reduces the number of total observations, the benet is
that econometric analysis of the matched data set will not have the bias of using the entire
sample. We preprocess the data using the R software MatchIt package developed by Ho
et al. (2007b). We match the observations using slope, soil permeability, elevation, and we
require an exact match for the township variable.
<< Insert Figure 3 >> << Insert Figure 4 >>
Figures 3 and 4 provides a comparison of the estimated propensity score for the treat-
ment and control samples before and after matching. Before matching, the control group
has a much higher proportion of the distribution with propensity scores below 0.30 and that
proportion is reduced in the matched control sample. This corresponds to an increased pro-
portion of the control group with propensity scores in the [0.30 0.60] interval after matching.
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The distribution of the propensity score for the treatment group (the surface water area) is
much closer to the initial distribution after matching, as fewer observations are dropped from
this sample during the matching process. However, this group also shows that the propor-
tion of observations in the [0.30 0.60] range is higher after matching. Figure 4 shows a jitter
plot of the same information. This shows that the observations dropped from the control
group are mostly those with propensity scores less than 0.3 while the dropped treatment
observations span a wider range.
3.3.1 Bivariate Probit Results of the Decision to Adopt Conservation Technol-
ogy
Using the preprocessed data allows us to estimate the impact of the water service area
variable on the adoption of conservation irrigation with greater condence that the result is
due to the actual dierence in the water source (i.e., the input price variation) instead of
being due to other observable dierences in the two samples.
The second issue we need to resolve with is that irrigation technology is not independent
of crop choice. In particular, the distinction between perennial crops and annual crops
is an important one in evaluating adoption choices. Perennial crops such as grapes and
oranges require a large initial investment. In addition, fallowing land is a limited option
with perennial crops. Adopting ecient irrigation with annual crops requires an investment
but the option to fallow land for a season is an option. As we showed in the economic model,
the shutdown eect may be a driver of higher technology adoption rates under xed input
prices.
To estimate land use choices we use a bivariate probit which allows us to jointly estimate
crop and irrigation technology. The bivariate probit model uses maximum likelihood to
estimate a bivariate normal distribution, where (x1; x2; ) =
R x1
 1
R x2
 1 (z1; z2; )dz1dz2
where (:) is the cumulative distribution function and (:) is the cumulative density function.
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By using this method we can estimate the overall impact of input price risk (measured by the
water service area) and how this impact diers by crop type. We rst verify the accuracy of
the estimation by comparing the percentage of elds that are correctly predicted. We consider
a eld to be correctly predicted if the probability associated with the actual technology-crop
value is over 0.5. We nd strong evidence that the model does an accurate job of predicting
outcomes, with 65.3 and 77.4 percent of the observations correctly predicted for the larger
groups (those with ecient irrigation) and 80.7 and 100 percent correctly predicted for the
smaller groups.
<< Insert Table 4 >> << Insert Table 5 >>
The coecients and marginal eects of the bivariate probit estimation are in Table 5.
Columns (1) and (2) show the estimated coecients for the full sample and columns (5) and
(6) show the estimated coecients for the matched sample. The coecients are estimated
using maximum likelihood. The estimated correlation between the two equations is signi-
cant in both estimations, which shows the importance of estimating the two equations jointly
instead of separately. Many of the interaction terms are signicant, providing evidence that
the impact of moving to a xed input price or increasing the price of water is not the same
for all elds and rms. For example, the negative coecients on the interaction terms with
Water price and land quality characteristics such as slope and permeability in the irriga-
tion technology equation show that while a higher water price increases the use of ecient
irrigation, this eect is reduced for land with a high slope or soil permeability. This is likely
due to the fact that land with a high slope and soil permeability gain more from precision
irrigation, and thus are likely to adopt even at low water prices. Overall, the coecients
on the land quality characteristics are of less signicance in the crop choice equation than
in the irrigation technology equation. This may be due to the fact that the relative impor-
tance of land quality characteristics are relatively more important in determining irrigation
technology since general market conditions are a major determinant of crop choice.
20
To fully understand the impact of these coecients we need to use the marginal eects,
incorporating both the direct coecient and any interaction terms. Columns (3)-(4) and
(7)-(8) show the estimated marginal eects for each variable, which are estimated condi-
tional on the values for each observation. Specically, the estimated marginal eects show
(@E[errig = 1jx])=@x. The marginal eects show some interesting patterns and are gen-
erally consistent with our expectations. Most of the results are similar between the full
and matched sample although there are some important dierences that are apparent in
the marginal eects. One dierence is that the marginal eects of some of the land quality
characteristics are lower in the matched sample than in the full sample. For example the
marginal eect of slope decreases from 13.6 to 9.8 percent. The coecient on permeability
also decreases by 7 percent. These results indicate that the coecients in the full sample
estimation are aected by the fact that the two samples are not suciently similar, leading
to some bias in the estimated coecients.
The economic model predicts that the risk aversion eect will lead to higher adoption
rates for individuals that are more risk-averse, particularly under stochastic input prices. One
interesting result is that the marginal eect of firmsize, which is a proxy for a lower degree
of risk aversion, is negative and signicant in both the irrigation and crop estimation. The
magnitude of the eect is higher with the matched sample, providing additional evidence that
samples may dier before pre-processing. Previous research has shown that large operations
tend to be less risk averse than small operations (Saha, Love, and Schwart, 1994; Saha,
Shumway, and Talpaz, 1994; Koundouri et al., 2009). This result indicates that both ecient
irrigation and perennial crops are used as risk reducing investments by small operations. This
result is consistent with the fact that perennial crops are a type of investment that reduces
future prot variability.
First, the eect of risk aversion, which we proxy using rm size, is as we expect. The
marginal eect of increasing rm size by 1000 acres is a 1.9 and 3.8 percent reduction in
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the probabilities of using ecient irrigation and perennial crops. While an increase of 1000
acres is large relative to the mean in the sample, increased consolidation in the agricultural
industry is likely to lead to the average rm size increasing.
The central question that we want to answer in the paper is how moving from stochastic
to xed input prices aects the adoption of conservation technology. When we use the full
sample without accounting for dierences in the characteristics of the surface and groundwa-
ter groups we that surface water users are 12.5 percent more likely to use precision irrigation.
However, once we account for the sample dierences we nd that surface water users are
9.3 percent more likely to invest in precision irrigation, a dierence of approximately 25
percent. In both cases, we nd clear evidence that stable input prices increase the rate of
ecient technology adoption. This provides evidence that shutdown eect and the positive
portion of the mean price eect more than compensate for the risk aversion eect and the
negative portion of the mean price eect. This is consistent with the hypothesis that a xed
water price that assures a reliable supply at a predetermined price leads to greater levels
of adoption, presumably since surface water users are more condent of earning a prot as
they do not face input price risk. Not surprisingly, areas with a higher average price (Water
price) are more likely to adopt precision irrigation.
We also nd that the water service area is a signicant indicator of the decision to adopt
perennial crops, with surface water users 16.5 percent more likely to adopt crops such as
grapes or citrus. This makes sense in the economic framework, since the choice of crop does
not directly change the input use eciency and eective price for water. Consistent with this
result, we nd that Water price has no signicant eect in the crop choice equation. Finally,
the positive marginal eect of eld size on perennial crop adoption and insignicant eect
on ecient irrigation adoption shows that there are dierences in the economies of scale
associated with these two investments. Perennial crops show a higher level of economies of
scale while that relationship does not exist with ecient irrigation. Most of the other land
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quality variables show the expected sign, with higher values for slope and soil permeability
increasing the probability of adopting conservation irrigation. This is consistent with agro-
nomic realities which show that conservation irrigation can reduce runo from elds and
that this eect is higher with higher soil permeability and slope.
These results, which show that stable input prices may increase the use of conservation
technologies are important if policymakers want to increase the use of ecient technology.
This paper estimates these eects using data on irrigation technology adoption in agriculture
but the same concerns are relevant in understanding how fuel or electricity rates aect the
use of energy ecient appliances. In fact, trying to reduce price uncertainty it is a common
practice for water, energy, or electricity utilities to oer xed-rate contracts to customers.
For example, Black Hills Energy, a natural gas provider, recently oered customers an option
to sign up for an APO, or Annual Price Option which would guarantee a xed price for a
12-month period.7 The results from the current paper suggest that these types of oers may
increase a customer's incentive to adopt energy ecient technologies. Further work needs
to be done to examine the impact of input price use on decision making across a range of
industries.
While the result show strong statistical evidence that xed input prices increase the
adoption of conservation irrigation technology, there are some limitations to the analysis.
One limitation is that we cannot track an individual eld over time to determine when
investment decisions take place, we only observe the status of a eld in a particular year.
This is a concern in both the analysis we present with multiple years and with the testing
that we do with a single year of data. We have incorporated many characteristics of the
individual eld but we only have limited information about the landowner. We expect that
having additional information about each landowner would allow better identication of the
7This oer was sent to customers in Nebraska, and oered a set price of $0.61764 per therm, not including
fees and taxes, for the period from November 2010 - October 2011. The program is not designed to save
customers money over the period, and the price is set to be revenue neutral based on expected prices.
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characteristics that aect risk preferences and technology choice. Finally, we expect that the
results of our general economic model may be even more important in an industry where
temporarily shutting down operations for a short period (hours or days) is feasible. There is
little empirical evidence examining this question and we leave it to future research to do so.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we look at the incentives for a rm or producer to adopt conservation technol-
ogy, and compare those incentives when input prices are xed and when they are stochastic.
The results are important in determining the eects of policies and programs designed to
reduce price uncertainty. For example, rms that can contract with input suppliers face a
more certain input price than rms without that ability. Understanding how this impacts a
decision to adopt conservation practices is important in determining the potential demand
for new conservation technologies, or in understanding observed behavior. We show that
there are three eects of a shift to xed input prices on the adoption of technologies that
conserve the input: the shutdown eect, the mean price eect, and the risk aversion eect.
The shutdown eect increases adoption rates under xed prices since shutting down is not
necessary. The mean price eect has two components: a lower eective price under stochas-
tic prices and a greater range of operation with conservation technology. The net eect of
this is ambiguous. Finally, the risk aversion eect increases the probability of adopting a
technology under input price risk.
The empirical analysis uses data on conservation technology adoption in the irrigated
agriculture sector. A unique aspect of this data is that the producers are divided into two
separate groups, where one group faces a xed input price while the other has to purchase
inputs where the price depends on market conditions. After preprocessing the data, a tech-
nique that allows us to measure the impact of the xed input price consistently, we nd that
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there is a positive average treatment eect, and that moving from stochastic to xed input
prices increases the use of conservation technology. This is an encouraging result, given the
increased use of xed price contracts for inputs in both energy and agricultural sectors. This
result suggests that policies that are designed to promote the use and adoption of conser-
vation technology may need to incorporate market and contract design in developing new
programs. Our results also show the importance of correcting for sample dierences in an
appropriate way when trying to estimate treatment eects. Not doing so may lead to biased
estimates of technology adoption behavior.
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Figure 1: Production from Applied Inputs
Table 1: Distribution of Fields by Crop and Irrigation Type
Perennial Annual Total
Conservation 2046 1741 3787
Gravity 876 101 977
Total 2922 1842
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Production and Environmental Data
Variable Mean Standard
Error
Service area (=1 if surface water, 0 else) 0.444 0.497
Size of Field (acres) 46.8 45.4
Firm size (acres) 309.4 530.9
Slope (percent) 1.51 1.17
Soil Permeability (inches/hour) 3.32 3.00
Frost-free days (average days per year) 271.4 7.74
Elevation (feet above sea level) 529.5 118.3
Average precipitation (inches per year) 7.09 1.08
Average temperature (degrees Fahrenheit) 63.3 0.92
Marginal water price (dollars per acre-foot) 58.71 12.10
Number of Observations 4764
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Figure 2: Marginal Cost per Acre-Foot for Groundwater and Surface Water
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Table 3: Dierences in Variable Means by Water Service Area
Full Sample
Variable Groundwater Surface Water Test of Mean Percent
Service Area Service Area Dierences Dierence
Field size (acres) 44.9 48.3 -1.22 7.0
Firm size (acres) 276.9 319.1 -0.63 13.2
Slope 1.20 1.75 -9.10*** 31.4
Soil permeability 3.80 2.42 8.43*** 36.3
Frost-free days 272.8 270.6 5.28*** 0.8
Elevation 488.5 582.1 -14.3*** 16.8
Precipitation 6.97 7.10 -2.15** 1.8
Temperature 63.5 63.1 7.94*** 0.6
Township 11 0.135 0.212 -3.49*** 36.3
Township 12 0.029 0.104 -5.27*** 72.1
Township 29 0.011 0.083 -6.09*** 86.7
Township 30 0.318 0.307 0.43 3.5
Township 31 0.331 0.150 7.14*** 54.7
Township 32 0.175 0.144 1.46 17.7
Number of Observations 2648 2116
Z-statistics are listed for discrete variables while T-statistics are listed for continuous vari-
ables. A  superscript denotes that the variable is a dummy variable. Statistical signicance
of dierences at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels denoted by ***, **, and * respectively.
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Figure 3: Histogram of Propensity Scores Pre- and Post- Matching
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Distribution of Propensity Scores
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Figure 4: Jitter Plot of Propensity Scores Pre- and Post- Matching
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Table 4: Comparison of Actual and Predicted Outcomes (N=3406)
Perennial Conservation Percent Correctly Predicted Total Observations
Yes Yes 77.4 1,110
Yes No 65.3 943
No Yes 80.7 57
No No 100 3
We count a prediction as correct if the probability associated with the actual outcome is
over 0.5. The 100 percent correct outcome for observations in annual crops with gravity
irrigation is due to a small number of total observations (N=3).
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